With Malice toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage by Boasberg, James E.
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 13 | Number 3 Article 3
1-1-1991
With Malice toward None: A New Look at
Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage
James E. Boasberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
James E. Boasberg, With Malice toward None: A New Look at Defamatory Republication and Neutral Reportage, 13 Hastings Comm. &
Ent. L.J. 455 (1991).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol13/iss3/3
With Malice Toward None: A New Look





I. Unknowing Republication of Falsehood .................... 457
A . Background .......................................... 457
B. Origins of the Wire Service Defense ................... 458
C. The Wire Service Defense Since Sullivan .............. 459
D. Beyond Wire Services ................................ 462
II. Knowing Republication of Falsehood ...................... 465
A. Introduction of the Neutral Reportage Theory ........ 465
B. A Framework for Neutral Reportage ................. 469
C. Rejection or Limitation of the Defense ................ 470
D. Extension of Neutral Reportage ...................... 474
E. Commentators' Efforts ............................... 477
III. Elaborating a New Theory for Neutral Reportage .......... 479
A . A ccuracy ............................................ 479
B. N eutrality ............................................ 480
C . A ttribution .......................................... 481
D. Responsibility of Source .............................. 481
E . C ontext .............................................. 482
F. & G. Status of Source and Target ..................... 482
H. Relevance to Controversy ............................ 486
I. Final Test ........................................... 487
IV . Conclusion ............................................... 487
* B.A., Yale College; M.ST., Oxford University; J.D., Yale University. The author is
currently a clerk for Judge Dorothy Nelson on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.
The author thanks Ralph Brown and Peter Edelman for their extensive help. He also
thanks Ed Bums, Kevin Baine, David Kendall, and Rodney Smolla for comments on an ear-
lier draft.
Introduction
In one of the few instances where folk wisdom has been directly
enshrined in the common law, the apothegm "Talebearers are as bad as
talemakers" appears as the rule "One who republishes a libel adopts it as
his own."' This meting out of equal punishment to the repeater as well
as the original defamer has troubled both courts and commentators, who
have long struggled with the value and legality of republishing defama-
tory material. Most analyses have started from the fair report privilege,
which protects the accurate reporting "of any official proceeding, or any
action taken by any officer or agency of the government." 2 While this
privilege is rarely challenged today, a new battle rages over the emerging
doctrine of neutral reportage. First articulated only fourteen years ago in
the Second Circuit case of Edwards v. National Audubon Society,3 this
theory posits that in certain circumstances the media should be allowed
to republish defamatory statements made by others, even when the re-
publisher knows or has reason to believe that the statements are false
(i.e., when the republisher does have actual malice). A related topic that
has largely been ignored is the republication of false statements that the
republisher thinks are true. While the actual malice standard would pro-
tect republishers from suits by public figures, private figures would still
have causes of action where the republisher was negligent.4
This Article addresses three issues. First, it analyzes the "wire ser-
vice defense," a theory that allows republishing of material from certain
reliable publications without fear of liability where republishers thought
the story or statements were true, regardless of whether private or public
figures are involved. Introduced over fifty years ago, this defense has
received surprisingly little attention. Second, moving from unknowing to
knowing falsehood, this Article reexamines the turbulent fourteen-year
history. of neutral reportage. Third, after an examination of the most
effective arguments on both sides, this Article proposes a new constitu-
tional privilege of neutral reportage: Media defendants may rely on the
privilege when they accurately republish any defamatory statement made
by or about a public figure, as long as attribution to and identification of
the source are made.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
2. Id. § 611 comment d.
3. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
4. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court had emphatically
distinguished public from private figures. It left in place the Sullivan standard of actual malice
for public figures, but refused to compel private figure plaintiffs to meet a similar standard.
Instead, the Court held that states could create their own level of fault in private figure cases,
though they could not impose a strict liability standard. Id. at 347. Most states opted for a
variant of negligence or gross negligence for private figure plaintiffs.
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I
Unknowing Republication of Falsehood
This first section addresses the republication of defamatory state-
ments from another publication where the republisher did not act with
actual malice under the celebrated test propounded in New York Times v.
Sullivan. ' In other words, the republisher neither knew that the state-
ments were false, nor acted with reckless disregard of the truth. It is
fairly obvious that no liability could arise for unknowing republication of
falsehoods about public figures, since actual malice is required for pub-
lishers and republishers alike. Private figures, however, could theoreti-
cally win if the republisher was negligent. This Article proposes that
even where republication defames private figures, republishers should es-
cape liability, either under the wire service defense or the defense of neu-
tral reportage.6
A. Background
At common law, each republisher was as liable for defamatory ut-
terances as the original speaker, largely because the repeater was seen to
have adopted the libel or slander as his own.7 No consideration was
given to whether the republisher believed the statement. The rule was
seen as'an effective deterrent against the spreading of malicious gossip.
This approach, however, severely hamstrung many publishers for the
simple reason that each newspaper or radio station could not individually
verify every report it published or broadcasted, particularly those coming
from other cities, states, or even countries. Publishers had neither the
time nor the financial and physical resources to do such checking. As a
result, members of the media had to rely on each other for stories and
leads to other stories.
Wire services, originally named for their operation over telegraph
wires, grew to meet the needs of newspapers in various parts of the coun-
try. By subscribing to wire services, newspapers could take advantage of
the manpower and finances of large services, which could afford to send
reporters to myriad locations. Without these services, even large papers
would be vastly restricted in what they could report, since no paper
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. It is essential to understand that Part I refers to situations where media are the origi-
nal publishers. Parts II and III concerns the reporting or republishing of all statements,
whether made by individuals or by media.
7. See, e.g., Luboe v. Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., 101 F. Supp. 234 (D.D.C.
1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Times Publishing Co. v. Carlisle, 94 F. 762 (8th
Cir. 1899); Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N.Y. 54 (1858); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 578 (1977).
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could support a bureau in every state or a reporter in every foreign coun-
try. Small papers would likely be confined to reporting purely local news.
It quickly becomes apparent, however, that an erroneous dispatch by the
wire service would be repeated by all of its subscribers. Under the com-
mon law of defamation, if the original report was defamatory and action-
able, so was its republication by countless other papers. Thus, the wire
service and each of its individual subscribers were potentially liable for
defamation.
B. Origins of the Wire Service Defense
The "wire service defense" originated in 1933 in Layne v. Tribune
Co., I but has been sporadically applied since its inception. In Layne, the
plaintiff sued the publisher of the Tampa Morning Tribune for its publi-
cation of allegedly defamatory press dispatches sent out by wire services.
The court held that
[tihe mere reiteration in a daily newspaper, of an actually false, but
apparently authenic [sic] news dispatch, received by a newspaper pub-
lisher from a generally recognized reliable source of daily news, such
as some reputable news service agency engaged in collecting and re-
porting the news, cannot through publication alone be deemed per se
to amount to an actual libel by indorsement, in the absence of some
showing... that the publisher must have acted in a neglignt, reckless,
or careless manner in reproducing it to another's injury.
Two important qualifications to republication emerge in this paragraph.
First, the dispatch must be "apparently authentic." Second, it must
come from a "generally recognized reliable source." Also significant is
the fact that, though this case concerned wire services and a "news ser-
vice agency" is mentioned as one example of a "generally recognized reli-
able source," the Layne court did not confine its decision to wire services.
Thus, while this defense is referred to as the "wire service defense," it
was not originally limited to wire services.
The Florida court recognized the necessity of such a doctrine. Small
newspapers must rely on press dispatches and wire service reports in or-
der to report on events occurring outside their own geographical area.
Without a bureau or correspondents in major news-making cities such as
Washington, D.C. and New York, virtually every small paper would be
forced to ignore national news and to print only local news or national
"fluff pieces," which carry no threat of defamation. The wire services,
moreover, would be of little use if their subscribers had to either verify
events themselves or refrain from printing them. As the Layne court
explained,
8. 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
9. Id. at 186, 146 So. at 238.
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No newspaper could afford to warrant the absolute authenticity of
every item of its news, nor assume in advance the burden of specially
verifying every item of news reported to it by established news gather-
ing agencies, and continue to discharge with efficiency and promptness
the demands of modem necessity for prompt publication, if publication
is to be had at all.10
It is arguable that a contrary ruling would have crippled both wire serv-
ices and small papers of a national bent, leaving the field of national news
reporting exclusively to the largest papers and thereby narrowing the
spectrum of comment and criticism.
Florida marginally extended the wire service defense twenty-seven
years later in MacGregor v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. " The Mac-
Gregor court, relying heavily on Layne, ruled against the plaintiff in a
defamation action against a republishing newspaper that had created the
headline for a republished piece of a wire service story. The court held
that as long as the republisher's headline did not "extend beyond the
context of the article," it was protected under Layne. 12
C. The Wire Service Defense Since Sullivan
The landmark decision of New York Times v. Sullivan 3 changed the
law of defamation considerably for republishers. The debate over repib-
lication of defamatory materials about public figures ended quickly, be-
cause after Sullivan, republishers that relied on wire services, or even
major papers or reputable magazines, could not be held liable for defa-
mation unless they possessed actual malice. 4 Simply put, a republisher
of, for example, an Associated Press (AP) or Washington Post article
could rarely be accused of "entertain[ing] serious doubts as to the truth
of [the] publication."'" Only if. republishers possessed independent
knowledge of the falsity of an article could they potentially be found lia-
ble. After Sullivan, courts continually rejected the defamation claims of
public figures against republishers, holding that reliance on wire services
automatically obviated any possibility of actual malice when the repub-
lisher did not possess contrary knowledge.' 6
10. Id. at 188, 146 So. at 239.
11. 119 So. 2d 85 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
12. Id. at 88.
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Id. at 283.
15. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
16. See, e.g., Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in which the
court rejected a suit by a public figure against both a wire service and an evening newspaper.
As to the latter, the court, though omitting reference to Layne, said, "Newspaper editors have
no cause to doubt the accuracy of a major wire service dispatch, absent an apparent inconsis-
tency or other indication of error." Id. at 1176; see also Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 16-
17 (D. Alaska 1979). (A public figure plaintiff could not recover from the Ketchikan Daily
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The debate, therefore, quickly shifted to private figure defamation.17
If relying on the Associated Press or United Press International (UPI)
could never approach actual malice, could such reliance ever fall under
the negligence standard of liability adopted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
for private figure plaintiffs?'8 Negligence was not the standard according
to Layne, in which the court held that republication alone was not "neg-
ligent, reckless, or careless."' 19 Still, the great majority of courts had
never touched on the wire service defense before 1964, and many were
cognizant of the great gulf Sullivan created between public and private
figures. If the former were to be accorded decidedly less protection now,
perhaps the latter's armor ought to be hardened further.
Yet as post-Gertz courts began to entertain private figure republica-
tion suits, they quickly endorsed the Layne rationale and extended the
wire service defense to protect republishers of defamatory material aimed
at nonpublic figures. For example, in Zetes v. Richman,2 0 Tonawanda
Publishing Corp. was allowed to rely on a UPI wire story, which stated
that the plaintiff sold poor-quality pennies at the 1980 Lake Placid Win-
ter Olympics. The republisher, clearly within the limits of New York's
"grossly irresponsible" standard of liability, was "qualifiedly privileged
to rely on the research of the original publisher unless it 'had, or should
have had, substantial reasons to question the accuracy of the articles or
the bona fides of [the] reporter.' ",21 This caveat is critical. The privilege
rests on the assumption that the republisher does not have information
about the story and must blindly rely on the wire service. Where this is
not the case, and the republisher has contrary knowledge as to falsity, the
republisher would have actual malice and could not hide behind the wire
service defense.
The two definitive recent cases on republication of wire service sto-
ries about private figures are Appleby v. Daily Hampshire Gazette 22 and
News, which had relied on the Associated Press, which in turn had relied on Investigative
Reporters and Editors, Inc. for its story on drug traffickers. The court concluded, "In sum-
mary, both newspapers relied on the reputation of the AP as a reliable news source in publish-
ing the Alfred Gay story. Without relying on such news-gathering sources, defendants argue,
local newspapers would be forced to publish only local news."); Mehau v. Gannett Pacific
Corp., 66 Haw. 133, 148, 658 P.2d 312, 322 (1983) (citing both Waskow and Gay and rejecting
a public figure's call for prior investigation upon republishers of wire service stories: "A clearer
inducement than this to the media self-censorship decried by the Supreme Court would be
difficult to conjure.").
17. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see also supra note 4.
18. Id. at 347.
19. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 186, 146 So. 234, 238 (1933).
20. 86 A.D.2d 746, 447 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
21. Id. at 747, 447 N.Y.2d at 779 (quoting Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 369, 383; 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1307, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 952 (1977)).
22. 395 Mass. 32, 478 N.E.2d 721 (1985) (includes three companion cases).
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Brown v. Courier Herald Publishing Co.2" Appleby concerned stories
based on UPI and AP reports about a search for dead bodies on the
premises of the plaintiff, who was later convicted of assault and battery,
rape, and kidnapping, though not of multiple murders. The court con-
cluded that "in ordinary circumstances, no jury could reasonably find
that a newspaper had acted negligently in relying on the accuracy of a
story from a reputable wire service."24 Noting Layne, the court stated
that "[b]ecause verification would be time-consuming and expensive, im-
posing such a burden would probably force smaller publishers to confine
themselves to stories about purely local events."" The court refused to
recognize a distinction between verifiable and nonverifiable wire stories.
While the plaintiff desired a rule that at least forced republishers to check
stories arising in a proximate geographic area, the court refused to create
such a boundary, stating that a "publisher could only rarely be com-
pletely assured that his assessment of nonverifiability would stand up at
trial.
, 26
Brown involved libel actions against radio stations and newspapers
that had relied on an AP report that erroneously claimed that the plain-
tiff had been indicted for threatening the life of a federal witness .2
Brown, though very recent, is the first case to trace the origins of the wire
service defense, and one of the first to use the term itself. After mention-
ing Layne, the court stated that:
[W]hen a local media organization receives a wire service release, it has
a duty to read the release to ensure that the face of the story itself does
not contain any inconsistencies. The local media organization also has
a duty to refrain from publishing the news story if the news organiza-
tion knows the story is false or if the release itself contains unexplained
inconsistencies. The local media organization does not have a duty,
however, to independently verify the accuracy of the wire service
release.
28
This is the clearest elaboration of the doctrine in its entirety. Because no
case has contradicted either Brown or Appleby, the wire service defense
stands on firm terrain. It is important to note that the republisher is
23. 700 F. Supp. 534 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
24. 395 Mass. at 37-38, 478 N.E.2d at 725 (emphasis added).
25. Id., 478 N.E.2d at 725.
26. Id. at 39, 478 N.E.2d at 726. But see Painter, Republication Problems in the Law of
Defamation, 47 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1153 (1961) (local newspapers should have duty of verify-
ing those items that can be checked easily, i.e., local stories).
27. Georgia's state courts had not yet considered the issue, and thus the federal district
court chose "the rule that it believe[d] the state's highest court [was] likely to adopt sometime
in the future from all that [was] known about its methods of reaching decisions." Brown 700
F. Supp. at 537. Using Georgia tort standards, the court found that ordinary care would be




required only to check the story for inconsistencies or known falsehoods.
The republisher has no duty to independently verify the original story.
Therefore, any liability is predicated on the republisher's knowledge of
the story's falsehood, essentially the actual malice standard.
In a sense, courts are holding republishers of defamatory material
about private figures to the same actual malice test that applies to public
figures. If the standard is identical, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff is
a public or private figure-republication from wire services may be pre-
sumed to be per se nonnegligent. This result is the wisest course for
courts to follow when dealing with republications of wire service reports.
D. Beyond Wire Services
Though the present state of the wire service defense appears reason-
ably clear and uniform, discussion of this defense should not end. In-
stead, using wire services as the salient, the battle may now be joined on
other fronts. Although many courts have not rejected the doctrine out-
right, almost none have extended it beyond wire services to reliance on
newspapers or magazines. This may be the result, at least partially, of a
misunderstanding about the doctrine's origins. As noted earlier, Layne
mentioned wire services as an example of a "generally recognized relia-
ble source of daily news,"29 but did not limit the category.30 Indeed, the
Florida court did not coin the term "wire service defense," which has
only arisen very recently. It seems that the most integral component of
the defense is the recognized reliability of the source, and this would
appear to extend far beyond mere wire services.
There is, surprisingly, only one case thus far that has extended this
defense to republishers who have relied on original publishers that were
not wire services. In Nelson v. Associated Press,3" the psychic patronized
by Roxanne Pulitzer sued the AP, Newsweek, and other publishers for
allegedly defamatory statements made about her in the course of com-
mentary on the Pulitzer divorce trial.32 A number of defendants re-
sponded by asserting the wire service defense. First, the court held that
the Miami Herald was entitled to rely on the reporting of AP: "If there
is ever a situation which gives rise to a [d]efendant's ability to assert the
wire-service defense, this is it."33 Second, it held that the publishers of
the New York Post could also rely on AP.34 Third, the court rejected the
29. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
31. 667 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
32. This is spicy reading, even for those who are bored by libel law.
33. 667 F. Supp. at 1479.
34. Id. at 1482.
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plaintiff's proposed requirement of a wire service byline in all cases in
which the defense was asserted.a5
A more interesting aspect of Nelson, however, is the use of the de-
fense by Newsweek, a weekly magazine rather than a daily newspaper. It
could not be maintained that Newsweek is resource poor and could not
afford to check stories around the country. Furthermore, a weekly does
not suffer from the same deadline pressures from which a daily suffers.
Though Newsweek possesses far more time and resources than do small
dailies, the court held the "same privilege ought to apply to news periodi-
cals such as Newsweek, which very obviously must rely for their sources
of information upon other reliable periodicals, newspapers, and wire ser-
vice reports."36 The Nelson court's reasoning is sound. If reliability is
indeed the key component, then the status of the republisher is irrelevant;
only the original publisher's identity is relevant. But even more signifi-
cant is the other great leap in the court's opinion, namely that the origi-
nal publisher can be "reliable periodicals" or "newspapers," not just wire
services. In fact, the author of the Newsweek piece relied on the Wash-
ington Post, the New York Daily News, and the Miami Herald. 37 While
the Post may be considered equally as reliable as the wire services, most
major metropolitan newspapers do not inspire the same level of trustwor-
thiness. Thus, the critical question is how far the wire service defense
should be extended beyond wire services to different types of original
publishers.
In answering this question, there are no set criteria. If the wire ser-
vice defense arose because the services were inherently reliable, how
should the credibility and dependability of various newspapers and
magazines be measured? Because no publication receives ratings for
truth or honesty, the only objective indices are longevity and circulation,
and these are unsatisfactory. The New York Times, arguably, is more
reliable than People magazine or the New York Post, and these latter two
may be deemed more credible than supermarket tabloids. Yet gray areas
abound in the interstices, rendering the task of line-drawing almost im-
possible. At the same time, it is unrealistic to confine the wire service
defense to wire services and not allow republishers to rely on the most
established and credible papers and magazines. Because a theory that
covers only wire services would be a retreat, but since no means exist to
draw the line elsewhere, the defense is apparently trapped.
There is, however, an Ariadne both to lead the way out of this laby-
rinth and to provide a transition to the next section .f this Article-the
35. Id. at 1482.
36. Id. at 1477.
37. Id. at 1475.
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doctrine of neutral reportage.38 Neutral reportage, as Part III proposes,
ought to permit the republishing of statements made by or about public
figures, whether or not the republisher has knowledge of falsehood. If
newspapers or other media are defined as public figures,3 9 the republica-
tion of their stories is a republication of a statement by a public figure.
Neutral reportage would then cover any republication of media stories,
thus saving us from any endeavor to create a Vatican-like index of "relia-
ble publications."
Using this theory, any publication could republish information from
any newspaper or magazine under one of two formulae. First, if the orig-
inal publication was inherently reliable (e.g., wire services, the Post, or
the Times) the republisher could never be negligent, let alone have actual
malice. Second, if the original source was not entirely trustworthy or
even downright scurrilous, the republisher could claim the protection of
neutral reportage, because it would merely be reporting a statement by a
public figure (i e., another paper or magazine). As long as the statement
was attributed and accurately reported, as will be explained in Part III,
no liability could attach. A republisher, who is unsure about whether the
original media source is reliable, may avoid that determination com-
pletely by meeting the neutral reportage requirements. Using this ap-
proach, even items from the supermarket tabloids could be republished
with attribution because they are also public figures. In fact, they are
probably more "public" than most publications.'
The foregoing discussion provides several rules. First, the media
should. be able to republish information contained in a wire service ac-
count without attribution and with no fear of liability to either public or
private figures, because such action can never give rise to negligence un-
less the republisher knew or should have known of the falsehood. Sec-
ond, under an extension of the wire service defense, the media should be
privileged to republish, without attribution, information contained in a
few leading lights such as the Washington Post or the New York Times,
which are as inherently reliable as the wire services themselves. This in-
formation could concern public or private figures. Finally, the media
38. In Greek mythology, Ariadne was the daughter of Minos and Pasiphae. She supplied
Theseus with the yarn that enabled Theseus to escape from the labyrinth.
39. This may appear to be begging the question, but it is not such a leap to assume that
the media acts as a public figure. First, most people are more interested in what their daily
paper says than in any individual's comments. Second, if the spokesperson for a major corpo-
ration, not a public figure in her own right, made a comment, the statement would be consid-
ered to be made by the corporation and thus by a public figure. If organizations are public
figures, surely media organizations must be included under this umbrella.
40. It should be noted again that this discussion only refers to situations where another
publication is the original speaker.
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should be able to republish stories about anyone from any other publica-
tion under the neutral reportage privilege, since the republishers would
be reporting statements made by public figures.4" In this last scenario, the
media must of course comply with all of the neutral reportage require-
ments elaborated in Part III, particularly attribution.
II
Knowing Republication of Falsehood
Where Part I dealt with statements that the republisher thought
were true, Parts II and III outline a theory that may be invoked when the
republisher wishes to print statements it knows are false. In other words,
the republisher does possess actual malice. Because media disputes typi-
cally involve statements that are not necessarily true, media organiza-
tions will have cause to fall back on neutral reportage more often than
the wire service defense and the extensions enumerated in Part I.
The origins of neutral reportage may be found in the common-law
privilege of fair report. This doctrine allows the republishing of govern-
ment proceedings, such as senatorial debates or judicial opinions, or in-
formation made available to the public by the government or its agents,
regardless of its possible defamatory content or the reporter's awareness
thereof.42 The theoretical bases for the privilege are threefold: 1) the
press acts as the public's agent, since very few members of the populace
can themselves be present to garner information at official proceedings;
2) the press operates as a watchdog or supervisor, ensuring that these
proceedings are legitimate; and 3) the press promotes public awareness
about important issues that outweigh individuals' reputational
interests.43
A. Introduction of the Neutral Reportage Theory
The neutral reportage theory" was first introduced in 1977 in the
Second Circuit case of Edwards v. National Audubon Society.45 The case
41. I realize that our Ariadne of neutral reportage may have led readers deeper into the
labyrinth, where they may have already encountered the Minotaur of confusion. I therefore
beg their forbearance until they read the next two parts, which I hope will return them, The-
seus-like, to the light.
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 comment d (1977).
43. See Bowles, Neutral Reportage as a Defense Against Republishing Libel, I 1 COMM. &
LAW 3, 17 (1989); Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional
Privilege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1979).
44. Though Part I of this Article concerned the republication of already published state-
ments, neutral reportage deals with republishing or reporting statements occurring anywhere,
be they in print, via the telephone, or from a speaker's mouth.
45. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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concerned a suit against the New York Times for the accurate reporting
of allegedly libelous statements made by the National Audubon Society
about prominent scientists who supported the use of the insecticide
DDT. Specifically, the Society's vice president was quoted as saying that
certain scientists were "paid to lie." Under the Sullivan actual malice
test, if the Times knew this information was false, or if it entertained
serious doubts about its truthfulness, it should not have printed the accu-
sations. Yet the court took the opportunity to elaborate a new principle:
At stake in this case is a fundamental principle. Succinctly stated,
when a responsible, prominent organization like the National Audu-
bon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the [f]irst
[a]mendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those
charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their valid-
ity... What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were
made. We do not believe that the press may be required under the
[flirst [a]mendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely because
it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take up
cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear
of liability for defamation. . .The public interest in being fully in-
formed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues de-
mands that the 1ress be afforded the freedom to report such charges
without assuming responsibility for them.46
This passage suggests a number of important limitations on the
press before it may republish defamatory statements. First, the charges
must be made by a "responsible, prominent organization." Second, the
charges must be made against a public figure. Third, the charges must be
repeated in an "accurate and disinterested" manner. Fourth, it seems
that the charges must be made appurtenant to a controversy, although
this could be regarded as unnecessary, given the opinion's wording. The
third point is emphasized a little later in the opinion: "It is equally clear,
however, that a publisher who in fact espouses or concurs in the charges
made by others, or who deliberately distorts these statements to launch a
personal attack of his own on a public figure, cannot rely on the privilege
of neutral reportage."47
The difficulty with Edwards is that it chose a poor case in which to
announce a new theory. Neutral reportage should cover only those situa-
tions where the republisher knew that the statement was false or had
substantial doubts about its truth; in other words, where the republisher
did have actual malice.48 In Edwards, the reporter was not sure of the
truth or falsity of the statement. It may well have been true that some of
the scientists were lying, and that some of them may have received fees
46. Id. at 120.
47. Id.
48. See Comment, "The Privilege of Neutral Reportage"--Edwards v. National Audubon
Society, Inc., 1978 UTAH L. REV. 347 (authored by C. Johnston Crass).
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from DDT insecticide manufacturers, but these charges were never ex-
plored. At a minimum, the reporter did not have substantial doubts
about the truth of the statements. In fact, the decision itself later finds
that "the evidence adduced at trial was manifestly insufficient to demon-
strate 'actual malice.' "4 Neutral reportage, then, was not even neces-
sary to the decision! As will be argued in the following paragraphs, the
whole point of neutral reportage is to protect speech that the actual mal-
ice test does not protect. To introduce the theory in a case in which it is
superfluous, therefore, seems illogical.5"
The central feature of the neutral reportage theory was thus weakly
established in Edwards. Neutral reportage must protect publishers who
do possess actual malice in the Sullivan sense. If there is no malice, the
defendant need not fall back on neutral reportage; lack of actual malice is
protection enough. It is critical to grasp that neutral reportage does not
overlap with actual malice; it exists entirely outside that doctrine. It ex-
ists because there is a need for reporting on items that the reporter knows
or has reason to believe are false. To reiterate, "What is newsworthy
about such accusations is that they were made."51
Examples of the necessity for the privilege are easy to come by.
Suppose that during his election campaign, George Bush had said that
Michael Dukakis was a polygamist or that he regularly snorted cocaine.
Though the press may know this to be false, it is nonetheless very impor-
tant to report about it because it gives the public clear insight into the
speaker's character. If the press could never report outrageous state-
ments by public officials, the public would be precluded from forming a
realistic picture of such officials. If Jim Bakker or Al Sharpton could
never be quoted in making up fantastic lies, the public would never know
them to be charlatans.52 Thus, the arrival of neutral reportage, at least in
some form, has been long overdue.
The two other cases most often cited in the neutral reportage debate
followed soon after Edwards. Both misinterpreted Edwards, perhaps
even willingly, yet both involved fact patterns more closely linked to the
heart of the defense. In Dickey v. Columbia Broadcasting System,53 the
Third Circuit refused to adopt the doctrine in ruling for the plaintiff.
The case concerned a taped debate between candidates in a congressional
49. 556 F.2d at 120.
50. It is conceivable that the Edwards court could have held the quotation to be rhetorical
hyperbole. Under Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970),
where the plaintiff was referred to as a "blackmailer," such speech is not actionable.
51. 556 F.2d at 120.
52. I will admit, nonetheless, jhat without the media these two individuals would in all
likelihood slip back into the obscurity in which they belong.
53. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
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race. The court found that Columbia Broadcasting System, in subse-
quently permitting the program to be aired, had substantial doubts about
defamatory allegations made by a congressman on the program about a
public figure. In rejecting Edwards, the court made no attempt to discuss
the merits of the doctrine of neutral reportage, but instead rested its deci-
sion on the irreconcilability of Edwards and St. Amant v. Thompson.'4
St. Amant, a 1968 case, merely rephrased the actual malice test to require
the defendant to have "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice."" Obviously, the
Third Circuit missed the whole point of Edwards in interpreting neutral
reportage to be an appendage of actual malice. On the contrary, neutral
reportage only applies where actual malice probably exists. If the protec-
tion that neutral reportage provides is co-extensive with actual malice,
the defense is redundant.
The Second Circuit itself seemed to limit Edwards in 1980 in Cianci
v. New Times Publishing Co., 16 which reversed the district court's sum-
mary judgment for a paper that had printed a defamatory article about
then-Mayor of Providence Buddy Cianci, in which a private figure
claimed Cianci had raped her. The court explained that "a jury could
well find that the New Times did not simply report the charges but es-
poused or concurred in them." The rest of the discussion of neutral
reportage could be regarded as dicta, if the above statement was the
ground for refusing to apply the defense, because the report would then
not have been "neutral," as Edwards required. Unsatisfied with this, the
very circuit that propounded neutral reportage pressed on. The court
held that "fair reportage" needed "careful limitation," since otherwise its
"breadth" could lead an immune media "to espouse and concur in the
most unwarranted attacks, at least upon any public official or figure,
based on episodes long past and made by persons known to be of scant
reliability.""8
This is a complete misreading of Edwards, which required the
charges to be made by prominent and reliable organizations. It is easy to
understand "organizations" to include public figures, but Edwards never
said the source of the charges could be an irresponsible or private figure.
54. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
55. 583 F.2d at 1225 (citing Dickey v. Columbia Broadcst. Sys., 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968))
(emphasis in Dickey, 390 U.S. at 731). The court further attacked Edwards, stating that the
newsworthy test it espouses was rejected in Gertz 583 F.2d at 1226 n.5. Yet Edwards does not
rely on the newsworthy standard, but rather mentions it as one additional feature.
56. 639 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 69.
58. Id. at 69-70.
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Though the Cianci court claimed to narrow Edwards, it did nothing of
the sort. Instead, it merely refused to extend neutral reportage from pub-
lic figure sources. Perhaps the case should be read as an affirmance of
Edwards, focusing on the specific words of Cianci and not the general
tone. Cianci would thus refuse to extend the neutral reportage doctrine
to private figure sources. This, however, has not been done, and Cianci
has come to symbolize the Second Circuit's harnessing of its own
invention.
B. A Framework for Neutral Reportage
Cianci's misreading of Edwards and obliviousness of Dickey to its
central point are symptomatic of the turbulent fourteen-year history of
neutral reportage. Most courts have seized upon one corner or another,
yet very few have been able to take in the whole picture, mainly because
they have lacked a workable framework. By offering the following eight
different components of neutral reportage, it will be much easier to com-
prehend succeeding cases. Less perspicacity will be required to discern
the omissions and misinterpretations.
Different breakdowns have appeared in other cases and articles, but
none has listed more than five factors. Employing eight factors yields a
more comprehensive framework. The eight factors to consider are
whether
1) the report accurately quotes the source;
2) the report is neutral and disinterested;
3) attribution of the source is required;
4) the source is responsible;
5) the original statement occurs in public (e.g., a speech or press
conference);
6) the source of the statement (i.e., the original speaker) is a
public figure;
7) the target of the statement (i.e., the would-be plaintiff) is a
public figure; and
8) the report concerns a public controversy or is merely
newsworthy.
Before pressing on, it should be noted that Edwards seemed to re-
quire a responsible (#4) public figure source (#6), a public figure target
(#7), neutral (#2) and accurate (#1) reporting, and a controversy
(#8). Finally, the statement was given in a private telephone interview
(#5), and attribution to the speaker seems to be required (#3). Admit-
tedly, one difficulty is that Edwards never ranked any of its criteria in
order of importance or indicated whether any requirement was a sine qua
non for the operation of the privilege.
Keeping the eight factors in mind, the next three sections examine
the most important cases concerning neutral reportage that have arisen
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in the last fourteen years. These may be divided into two broad catego-
ries: those that reject or limit the doctrine and those that accept and
broaden it. Following this analysis, Part III returns to the eight catego-
ries and attempts to formulate the optimum solution for the future of
neutral reportage.
C. Rejection or Limitation of the Defense
It is undoubted that neutral reportage is a somewhat difficult con-
cept and, perhaps for that reason, many courts have refused to apply it.
Some courts have strained to find it irrelevant to the case before them,
thus absolving themselves of any requirement to analyze the defense on
its merits.59 Others have taken a look, with varying degrees of depth and
insight, and rejected its application in their particular circumstances.
Still others stumble about like Inspector Lestrade, waiting for Holmes
(Sherlock, not Oliver Wendell) to turn up and give them a clue.6'
Those courts that have refused to see a need for the defense rely
generally on the Dickey line of reasoning, stating that the actual malice
test is sufficient for the press. As noted before, this explanation neglects
that neutral reportage covers a wholly separate area apart from the Sulli-
van test, since it may only apply when actual malice does exist. Others
follow the general position that the media is free enough. In Janklow v.
Viking Press,6 for example, the court declined to adopt neutral report-
age, agreeing with Cianci that "the media already enjoys the generous
protection accorded by New York Times v. Sullivan with respect to erro-
neous statements of fact and opinion."62 Unfortunately, this was a bla-
59. See, e.g., Woods v. Evansville Press Co., Inc., 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986); Oilman v.
Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985); Basiliuts v. Honolulu
Publishing Co, 711 F. Supp. 548 (D. Haw.), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1394 (1989); White v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 707 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1989), modified, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1985); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time,
Inc., 619 F. Supp. 684 (D.N.J. 1985); Roberts v. Dover, 525 F. Supp. 987 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
60. Perhaps the most confused reading of all is Horvath v. Telegraph, (No. CA-8-175
(Ohio) App. March 8, 1982) (1982 WL 5841). The court begins this amusing opinion by
stating that the "United States Supreme Court has developed under the [f:irst [a]mendment to
the U.S. Constitution a doctrine known as 'neutral reportage' " when the Court has never even
mentioned such a doctrine, let alone accepted it. Id. at 6. The opinion then goes on to explain
that neutral reportage applies to the present case because there was no actual malice. This
reasoning is precisely backwards, since the court need not even consider neutral reportage if no
actual malice exists. Finally, it explains that there was no determination of public figure sta-
tus, yet applies the actual malice standard anyway, forgetting that a determination of actual
malice is involved only where public officials or figures are present.
61. 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1985), aff'don other grounds, Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788
F.2d 1305 (8th Cir. 1986).
62. Id. at 881; see also Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 325
N.W.2d 511 (1982). Though Postill clearly elaborates the critical elements of Edwards and
even numbers five of them, it rejects the doctrine, citing Dickey, on the ground that "the press
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tant misreading of Cianci, which did not overrule Edwards, but merely
refused to extend it to private figure sources. Other courts have rejected
the defense more summarily.6" The Supreme Court of Kentucky, for
one, based its rejection on the simple fact that the United States Supreme
Court had not adopted it."
Most courts have declined to apply Edwards to different circum-
stances, but do not dismiss its validity entirely. It is in these fine distinc-
tions of dissimilar fact scenarios that the importance of the eight
aforementioned categories emerges. Illinois courts have provided a
wealth of opinions on the doctrine and are a good starting point. After
the adoption of the privilege in 1978 in Krauss v. Champaign News Ga-
zette,65 five separate opinions have appeared.
In Makis v. Area Publications Corp.,66 in which a newspaper quoted
comments by private figures about the director of a sky sailing school,
the majority did not mention neutral reportage. The dissent, however,
questioned whether the Supreme Court would accept the doctrine after
Gertz, which emphasized the public figure/private figure distinction: "If
comments about private.persons which also involve matters of public in-
terest are not to be accorded the more limited protection of the require-
ment that actual malice be established, it is doubtful that the broader
protection of the Edwards neutral reportage doctrine is constitutionally
required."67 The following year in Newell v. Field Enterprises, this view
was adopted by a majority of the court. Reading Edwards to require
only newsworthiness, the court refused to adopt it, citing Gertz' rejection
of this standard and the Makis dissent.69
Both of these opinions make the same error, namely finding that
neutral reportage and the result in Edwards contradict Gertz. In fact, the
cases are complementary. The Edwards court mentioned public contro-
versy as a possible requirement and stressed the necessity of a public fig-
is adequately protected by the burden of proof required by Sullivan." Id. at 622, 325 N.W.2d
at 518.
.63. See, e.g., Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (App. Div. 1982),
aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 628; 444 N.E.2d 1002; 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982) (holding simply that New
York's Fourth Department does not recognize Edwards).
64. See McCall v. Courier-J. Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982). Ryan v. Herald Ass'n, 566 A.2d 1316 (Vt. 1989), does not apply the
privilege for the sensible reason that the reporting was inaccurate.
65. 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (1978). See infra discussion section II(D).
66. 72 Ill. App. 3d 452, 395 N.E.2d 1185 (1979).
67. Id. at 463, 395 N.E.2d at 1193 (Romiti, J., dissenting). This is a reference to the
repudiation of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc:, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) in Gertz. Refusing to
agree that the test for actual malice was whether the comments dealt with matters of public
concern, the Court held that the key was whether they were about public figures.
68. 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434 (1980).
69. Id. at 756-58, 415 N.E.2d at 451-52.
1991]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
ure target and source. The Illinois courts have thus misread Edwards to
allow the reporting of any defamatory statement by any source about any
target so long as the subject matter is of public concern. If this were
Edwards' holding, then it is possible, though not definite, that it would
run afoul of Gertz. Because Edwards posits public figure requirements,
however, it is fully consistent with Gertz. 70
Three years later, in Fogus v. Capital Cities Media,71 an Illinois
court tried to straighten out the confusion. After noting a split between
Illinois districts, the court, tracking the language of Edwards, said that if
the neutral reportage doctrine does survive as a constitutional privi-
lege, or more likely, as a special common[-]law privilege, it would be
narrowly limited to a factual situation which is presented when a re-
sponsible prominent person or organization makes serious charges
against a public figure and those charges are reported in an accurate
and disinterested manner.72
The court realized that the privilege might be valid in some circum-
stances, and not in others. This interpretation allowed the court to avoid
defining all neutral reportage by its most extreme application and then,
having done so, to invalidate the entire doctrine. In Fogus, the court
avoided ruling on the doctrine because the allegations were made by un-
named persons. Attribution, the court stated, is a minimum requirement
for application of the doctrine.73 If attribution is not made, reporters
could use anonymous sources as shields behind which to publish defama-
tory material.
Two recent Illinois decisions have kept the controversy brewing. In
Davis v. Keystone Printing Service,74 the court refused to apply neutral
reportage for two reasons. First, it said that the target must be a public
figure, and second, the source must be responsible and prominent, not
"alleged alcoholic ex-drug addicts who had already professed a desire to
harm plaintiff's reputation. ' 75 The court in Owens v. Columbia Broad-
casting System76 cited Davis approvingly and agreed with both of the
above criteria in ruling for the plaintiff. The importance of these cases is
their focus on the source and that source's credibility. It is unclear
whether prominence or responsibility is the touchstone, or whether both
are required. For example, would public figure status suffice, or must the
media examine mystical responsibility indices before reporting charges?
70. Part of the error is due to a reliance on Krauss as interpreter.
71. 111 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 444 N.E.2d 1100 (1983).
72. Id. at 1063, 444 N.E.2d at 1102.
73. Id.
74. 1155 Ill. App. 3d 309, 507 N.E.2d 1358 (1987).
75. Id. at 323, 507 N.E.2d at 1369.
76. 173 I11. App. 3d 977, 527 N.E.2d 1296 (1988).
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Rhode Island was another laboratory in which this debate perco-
lated. In Martin v. Wilson Publishing Co.," the state supreme court held
that neutral reportage would apply "only in the extremely limited situa-
tion in which the publication accurately attributes such statements to an
identified and responsible source." '' Again, the court's language creates
the dilemma of locating the key component of the test. The case
presented the question of whether rumors that had been circulating
about the plaintiff's involvement in certain fires in the village could be
republished, absent any specified source. The decision is easier than
Fogus, for no case or commentator has argued that unsubstantiated ru-
mors having no identified source are fit for publication. If this were the
case, the media could publish any report by simply prefacing it with
something to the effect of "unidentified sources say . . . " This result
would be contrary to the purpose of the neutral reportage doctrine,
which is about reporting, not inventing.
In two New York cases, neutral reportage was found not to apply
when, respectively, the articles stated other facts and opinions supporting
the allegations and thus were not "neutral,"" 9 and when no "raging and
newsworthy controversy" existed.80 Finally, Dixson v. Newsweek,8 de-
cided the same year as Edwards, distinguished the latter on the grounds
that the plaintiff in that case had been a public figure. In Dixson, the
Tenth Circuit held that defamatory republications made about a private
figure target who had been fired from an airline position were not privi-
leged.82 No mention of the source was made.
The lengthiest treatment of neutral reportage by a court that did not
adopt the doctrine is found in the 1988 Pennsylvania case, DiSalle v. P. G.
Publishing Co.83 The case concerned republication of a private citizen's
defamatory remarks about a judge. The holding makes republished
statements privileged "only when a public official or a public figure al-
ready embroiled in a public controversy levels a false charge against a
public official or figure [that is accurately and disinterestedly made]." 4
The court thoroughly considered other possibilities before making its fi-
nal decision. First, it discarded the argument that the privilege is dupli-
cative and unnecessary in light of Sullivan: "The criticism that the rule
is superfluous, however, misses the intent of the neutral report privilege
77. 497 A.2d 322 (R.I. 1985).
78. Id. at 330.
79. Russo v. Padovano, 84 AD.2d 925, 926, 446 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (1981).
80. Lasky v. American Brdcst. Cos., 631 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
81. 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 631.
83. 375 Pa. Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345 (1988), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
84. Id. at 544, 544 A.2d at 1363.
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as expressed in Edwards. The privilege is superfluous only if its protec-
tion is co[-]extensive with actual malice. It is not.""5 Second, the court
recognized that a critical component of Edwards was "finding the consti-
tutional value of the statement in the nature of the defamer and his rela-
tionship to the controversy, not in the status of the person defamed." 6
Third, the court explained that "because neutral reportage intends to
protect the publication of statements known to be false, the purported
reliability of the source is totally irrelevant."8" Yet after this careful con-
sideration, the court still propounded a test that requires both a contro-
versy and a public figure target. The court's reasoning makes manifest
the necessity of a public figure source, but it sheds no light on why a
controversy and a public figure target are needed. Thus, this opinion,
despite making some headway, comes up short.
A final approach to rejecting or reshaping Edwards was seen in Mc-
Manus v. Doubleday & Co.,88 in which a book republished a comment by
the Irish Embassy about the public figure plaintiff. Here the court de-
cided that Edwards' reporter "simply reported an autonomous news
event," 89 but the present reporter was engaged in investigative reporting.
As a result, "no controversy raged around the libelous statement before
the reporter entered the scene."'  Edwards, it was held, contained no
indication that the "neutral reportage principle was meant to cover inves-
tigative reporting." 91 While it is true that Edwards did not contain a
specific reference to indicate the doctrine would apply to investigative
reporting, neither did it evidence any intention to exempt investigative
reporting. Moreover, the statement in Edwards was given in a private
telephone conversation, whereas in McManus, the implication was that
the statement was made at a public event. The McManus court, further-
more, did not provide any. guidance about a case involving investigative
reporting of a controversy. The distinction was novel, but specious.
D. Extension of Neutral Reportage
Having scrutinized the rejections and narrowings of neutral report-
age, an examination of those cases extending the doctrine beyond Ed-
85. Id. at 539, 544 A.2d at 1360.
86. Id. at 541, 544 A.2d at 1361.
87. Id. at 542, 544 A.2d at 1362.
88. 513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
89. Id at 1391.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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wards is in order. In Krauss v. Champaign News Gazette,92 the
forerunner of the five Illinois cases discussed above, an Illinois appellate
court adopted neutral reportage where the defendant published an assis-
tant state attorney's accusations of improprieties at a drug program. The
court enunciated a broad standard: "If the journalist believes, reasonably
and in good faith, that his story accurately conveys information asserted
about a personality or a program, and such assertion is made under cir-
cumstances wherein the mere assertion is, in fact, newsworthy, then he
need inquire no further."93 The court did not require a public figure
source or target, or even a controversy.94 As long as the statement is
newsworthy, it may be accurately republished. This is an exceedingly
expansive view of the doctrine, and one can see why other Illinois courts
reacted so strongly against Krauss. Some of those courts equated all
manifestations of neutral reportage with Krauss' far-reaching holding, in-
stead of comprehending that there was a vast spectrum between Edwards
and Krauss. Indeed, excepting those who have rejected the doctrine en-
tirely, all of the debate has occurred between those two poles.
Barry v. Time, Inc. 91 concerned defamatory statements made by bas-
ketball star Quintin Dailey about his college coach in a private interview
published in Sports Illustrated. The court held the privilege applies
"where the defamed person is a public figure ... who is involved in an
existing controversy, and the defamatory statement is made by a party to
that controversy." 96 To reach the standard, the court noted the impor-
tance of the "public's 'right to know' that serious charges have been
made against a public figure." 97 Interestingly, in a later footnote, the
court left open the possibility of applying the privilege to private figure
targets,9" which would undercut this rationale. The court's emphasis on
the prominence of the source was also puzzling, given that the opinion
only required that the source be involved in a controversy. Finally,
92. 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (1978). For a discussion of Krauss, see Dicker-
son, Fashioning a New Libel Defense: The Advent of Neutral Reportage, 3 COMM. & LAW 77
(1981).
93. 59 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 375 N.E.2d at 1363.
94. It is possible to argue that the reference to "personality" means that there must be a
public figure target, which other language in the opinion supports. Nonetheless, the language
seems to give protection to speech directed at private figure targets as long as the statements
are newsworthy.
95. 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
96. Id. at 1127.
97. Id. at 1125.
98. Id. at 1127 n.20. The court held that the coach was a public figure.
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though the republication must be accurate and neutral, the source need
not be trustworthy.99
The final and most recent case is In re UPI 1 This case goes the
furthest in establishing an expansive defense of neutral reportage. Ironi-
cally, it concerns Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 0' a case discussed ear-
lier with respect to the wire service defense. In Mehau, summary
judgment was awarded to several defendant newspapers that had relied
on a UPI wire story;102 in UPI, the wire service itself was sued for pub-
lishing allegations by a private figure that the plaintiff was a mob boss
and might have been connected with the disappearance of the private
figure's brother.103 The UPI court first dispensed with the notion that
the source must be "responsible" or "prominent" as "inconsistent with
the raison d'etre of the doctrine."" °  According to the court, the key was
that the press must be allowed to report serious charges against public
officials. 105 The opinion also eschewed the existing public controversy
requirement, specifically refusing to follow Barry on that ground and re-
quired only that the charges be serious and newsworthy.1°" Although
the court did not meticulously elaborate its own standard, it would seem
to allow accurate and neutral reporting of newsworthy charges by any
source against a public figure. 17
The Supreme Court, as stated earlier, has never confronted neutral
reportage, but a footnote in the recent case of Harte-Hanks Communica-
tions v. Connaughton 108 at least inspires hope that the Court is aware of
it. The facts presented a perfect opportunity for the Court to draw the
99. See Ward v. News Group Int'l, Ltd., 733 F. Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (citing
Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1984), which held that publisher and
reporter were protected by neutral reportage doctrine).
100. 106 Bankr. 323 (D.D.C. 1989).
101. See supra note 15 for a summary of Mehau v. Garrett Pac. Corp., 66 Haw. 133, 658
P.2d 312 (1983).
102. 66 Haw. at 156, 658 P.2d at 327.
103. 106 Bankr. at 329.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 331 n.19.
107. Other cases that uphold neutral reportage include Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881
F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990); Whitaker v. Denver Post,
4 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1351, 1352 (D. Wyo. 1978); Victor v. News and Sun-Sentinel Co., 6
Fla. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (Cir. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 467 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); El
Amin v. Miami Herald, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1079, 1081 (Fla. Cir. Ct. App. 1983) (disinter-
ested and accurate reporting of a newsworthy event); Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, 2 Fla.
Supp. 2d 137, 143 (Cir. Ct. 1982), aff'd, 444 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984) (application
where source responsible official, matter of public concern, and controversy present); J.V. Pe-
ters v. Knight Ridder, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1576, 1581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (accurate
and neutral report of newsworthy item of public concern).
108. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
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outlines of the doctrine, but the petitioner did not raise the defense and
the Court's first footnote explained that it would therefore not review
it.1" 9 In the case, a newspaper published with actual malice a private
figure's defamatory charges against a candidate for the office of munici-
pal judge. The Court could have held that republication of defamatory
statements made by private figure sources was not immunized, or it could
have held that republication of statements pertaining to an ongoing con-
troversy and directed at a public figure target was protected. Unfortu-
nately, the Court said nothing. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
Blackmun described as "unwise" the petitioner's strategic decision to
avoid any reliance on the neutral reportage defense." 10 He noted, "were
this Court to adopt the neutral reportage theory, the facts of this case
arguably might fit within it."'' Had the Court addressed this issue, it
would seem that Blackmun would agree, at the very least, with the Ed-
wards framework.
E. Commentators' Efforts
Courts have not been the only forum for the debate on neutral re-
portage; a few articles on the subject have been published in scholarly
literature. Most commentators are in favor of some version of the de-
fense, even if they cannot seem to agree on which version. A small mi-
nority, though, rejects it in toto. 1 12 One approach has been to allow the
neutral reportage defense as long as the source is a public figure and the
republication is accurate. In a student-written law review note entitled
"Protecting the Public Debate: A Proposed Constitutional Privilege of
109. Id. at 2682 n.1.
110. Id. at 2699 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
11. Id.
112. See, e.g., Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A Constitutional Priv-
ilege to Republish Defamation Should be Rejected, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (1982) (authored by
Dennis J. Dobbels). The author rejects the newsworthy test as being inconsistent with Gertz
and thinks that the actual malice test is sufficient as explained in Dickey. The concluding
paragraph explains the potentially destructive scenario: "Absolute immunity would be given
to any newsworthy statement without inquiry into the status of the person defamed or into the
reporter's subjective awareness of the falsehood he or she published." Id. at 1225. The first
half of this statement is true if the court used only the newsworthy standard, instead of looking
to target and source. It thus argues only against the most expansive possible reading of neutral
reportage. The second half of the statement is simply irrelevant, because the whole point of
the neutral reportage privilege is that it operates regardless of whether the reporter knows or
has reason to believe that the charge is false.
The most vehement attack on the privilege may be found, not surprisingly, in an Accu-
racy in Media (AIM) publication. AIM fulminated that Edwards established "a license to tell
lies that damage the reputation of others, even if [the media] know them to be lies, without
running the risk of having to pay a libel judgment .... If this incredible opinion is not over-
turned by the Supreme Court, the sewers of defamation will be flooding the Nation." AIM,
AIM REPORT, (June 1977), quoted in Bowles, supra note 43, at 4.
1991)
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Accurate Republication," " 3 the author explains that "public figures and
officials are so important to the public debate that their remarks contrib-
ute to that debate whether true or false."' 1 4 Through republication of
statements made by public figures, the public may gain insight into the
speaker's character. However, the author rejects an unlimited privilege
of republication that would protect charges made by private figure
sources against private figure targets as less relevant to the general public
debate.' ' Thus, according to the author, the key is the source, not the
target.
A different approach is to focus on the target and not the source. In
a student-written comment entitled "Restricting the First Amendment
Right to Republish Defamatory Statements," 116 the author says, "Ar-
guably, a serious charge against a public figure is itself newsworthy, re-
gardless of the source of the accusation."' ' Yet the author would limit
the privilege to situations in which "some minimum indicia of reliability
support the private figure's allegations. ""I Indeed, "because the public
is in no position to judge a private individual's credibility, the republisher
... should indicate the foundation from which a reader could conclude
that the source is credible."' ' This is a substantial qualification of the
privilege and could lead to difficulties in assessing the reliability of pri-
vate figure sources.
The student author of "The Developing Privilege of Neutral Report-
age"' 2o also focuses on the target, but does not qualify the neutral report-
age defense so much. The author's basic purpose seems to be no more
than to avoid emasculating Gertz' private figure/public figure distinction.
After conceding that there are strong first amendment reasons for pro-
tecting the republication of statements by public figure sources against
private figure targets, the author rejects neutral reportage protection in
this situation because prominent people would gain even greater access to
the media and would eliminate the private person's ability to rebut the
charges via the media. ' 2' The author concludes that the neutral report-
113. 58 TEX. L. REV. 623 (1980) (authored by Craig Smyser).
114. Id. at 625.
115. Id. at 638.
116. 69 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1981) (authored by John R. Oiler).
117. Id. at 1502 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 1515.
119. Id. at 1516.
120. 69 VA. L. REV. 853 (1983) (authored by R.W.C.) (the best of the pieces on neutral
reportage and also the most oft-cited).
121. Id. at 872 n.98.
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age defense should only protect statements aimed at public figure
targets. 1
22
All three of these approaches have loopholes, which can only be
closed by looking at both source and target. By focusing on the source,
as the first note does, important revelations about public figures might
not be aired if they came from private figure sources. Hidden deeds
might never be exposed if republication of allegations made by private
figures were not protected. Conversely, by concentrating on the target,
important insights into the character of public figure speakers might be
lost when they level charges against private figure targets. To learn that
public figures are liars or that they make irresponsible comments is ex-
ceedingly helpful in determining their worth.
III
Elaborating a New Theory for Neutral Reportage
From the existing cases and commentaries, a broad range of options
has emerged to help define the future of the neutral reportage defense.
Most of those individuals who have rejected the defense completely have
failed to grasp its nature as distinct from actual malice; therefore, most of
the sensible discussions about neutral reportage have occurred among
those people who believe in some variant of the privilege. The battle
wages in the middle ground between Edwards' fairly restrictive charac-
terization and later more expansive interpretations. In returning now to
our eight factors with a better comprehension of the options, we may
attempt to fashion the optimal solution for the future of neutral report-
age. The privilege should allow the accurate republication of any state-
ment by or about a public figure, as long as attribution to and
identification of the source are made.
A. Accuracy
The first category is accuracy. There is. little debate on this score if
accuracy is taken to mean a precise transcription of what was said.'23 If
a statement is not accurately reported, the paper could never use a repub-
lication defense for the simple reason that there was no republication.
The entire theory of neutral reportage stems from the idea that one may
report what another has said. If the republisher is not reporting what
was said but instead is twisting the words, then the republisher cannot
avail itself of the privilege. No case or commentator has ever challenged
122. Id. at 870-71, 874. For another option, see Dickerson, supra note 92, at 83 (key to
neutral reportage should be common-law malice or ill will).




this requirement. The only difficulty could arise where an exact tran-
script of the original statement does not exist, for instance where a re-
porter hears the statement in a quick exchange. In that case, the
standard should be actual malice. Thus, a republisher may claim accu-
racy as long as it did not have substantial doubts as to the wording of the
original statement.
B. Neutrality
The second category is neutrality, a term that is open to several in-
terpretations. On the one hand, the neutrality requirement could refer to
the actual statements. A paper that knowingly printed false statements
would have to either print a disclaimer or provide the opportunity for a
rejoinder by the defamed party. 24 This requirement, however, may well
run afoul of the doctrine elaborated in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,'25 in which a right of reply statute was found to abridge first
amendment freedoms.' 26 In fact, a requirement of neutrality would be a
difficult standard to maintain because the target plaintiff could always
argue that not enough counter-balancing details were provided. Papers
would be caught in the difficult position of deciding how much weight to
give each of several conflicting statements. This theory of neutrality
would foolishly bring back to life the repudiated "fairness doctrine."'
' 27
The second interpretation of the neutrality requirement is even
weaker. It would require papers to report stories in which they know-
ingly republished false statements in a neutral fashion. This requirement
would harm those segments of the media most in need of first amend-
ment protection, namely those with a particular slant or viewpoint. The
New York Times is likely to be less biased in its reporting than are
smaller papers or magazines, yet these latter-day pamphleteers and
polemicists require protection so that they may present the public with a
wide array of viewpoints. Newspapers get reputations for particular
slants, and the public takes this into consideration when reading them.
Because no member of the media has ever been required to be neutral,
particular stories that republish defamatory statements should not be re-
quired to be neutral either. Therefore, there should be no neutrality re-
quirement to invoke the neutral reportage defense. The media should be
124. Returning to our Bush-Dukakis hypothetical, supra text following note 51, under this
approach a paper would have to follow the reporting of Bush's charge with the reporter's own
knowledge that Dukakis had only one wife and that he had a clean nose.
125. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
126. Id. at 258; see Comment, Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1266, 1283-84 (1977) (authored by Leslie C. Levin).
127. It may well be lousy reporting not to get a response or a denial from the other side or
from the target, but bad journalism is not an actionable offense.
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allowed to accurately report statements or accusations without having to
be neutral, issue disclaimers, or print all possible exculpatory evidence.
C. Attribution
The third issue is attribution, which should definitely be required as
a prerequisite to invoking the neutral reportage defense. The whole point
of neutral reportage is to focus both on what was said and on who said it.
Not only the fact that the charge was made, but the maker of the charge,
must be mentioned. If the identity of the speaker was cloaked in ano-
nymity, much of the rationale for the privilege would disappear. The
fact that a particular speaker uttered certain words is often what makes
the statement newsworthy. It is important to know, for example,
whether a street-corner speaker or a low-level Pentagon staffer made the
hypothetical comment that General Noriega cannot get a fair trial be-
cause he is a CIA agent.
The republication of rumors or charges made by unnamed sources
would not be protected where the republisher was negligent or had actual
malice, depending on whether the plaintiff was a private or public figure.
Without an attribution requirement, a paper could anonymously quote
itself, thus turning any potentially libelous statement into an utterance
covered by the neutral reportage defense. This result would make a
mockery of both the privilege of neutral reportage and libel law in
general.
Admittedly, a difficulty arises when a source does not wish to be
revealed, yet the fact that the charge is being made is important. One
solution would require a paper to say something to the effect of "reliable
sources say .... ." This type of attribution, however, is unsatisfactory
and should not allow the paper to claim the defense. The critical goal of
identification triumphs over possible insights by anonymous sources,
which are now only actionable if false or at least negligently published.
In other words, the anonymous source may be quoted about a public
figure as long as no actual malice exists. In sum, people discount what
they hear by taking into account who said it. Without this information,
people have no measure for discount.
D. Responsibility of Source
The fourth criterion is the responsibility of the source. Courts have
differed in their approach to this issue. It should have no place as a
requirement for the neutral reportage defense. First, the courts and the
media should not be forced to judge who is and who is not responsible.
Would one lie make someone previously responsible now irresponsible?
Two? How many? In some cases, a statement is newsworthy precisely
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because the source is irresponsible. When political maverick Lyndon
LaRouche says that the Queen of England is a drug dealer, his irrespon-
sibility should not be an issue. The public realizes he is irresponsible, and
thus only the truly benighted could believe charges from his mouth. Fur-
thermore, if the public were prevented from reading about his scurrility,
they might be lulled into actually voting for him.128 Many prominent
people in our society have made unsubstantiated charges, and a newspa-
per should not be placed in the position of trying to decide which ones to
print based on its own assessment of the speaker's responsibility.
E. Context
The fifth criterion is the context of the speech. The issue here is
whether the defamatory statement must have been uttered in public, in
which case the reporter is a bystander reporting on public events that
anyone could have heard, or whether defamatory statements uttered in
private may also be protected by the defense. The former interpretation
harks back to the privilege of fair report. Publishing a statement made in
any public proceeding or which is a matter of public record is already
subsumed under that category. However, there is still a wide spectrum,
for example, between judicial proceedings and private conversation that
would entail enormous difficulties in line-drawing. How public would an
event have to be before a reporter could invoke the neutral reportage
defense? The crucial determinant should not be whether the speech is
public. What is critical is what is said by whom or about whom, and not
where it was said or to whom it was. Thus, the neutral reportage doc-
trine should not make a distinction for context of speech.
F. & G. Status of Source and Target
The most controversial categories of the privilege are the status of
the source and the status of the target, which are best dealt with together.
Possible options for the treatment of sources and targets include requir-
ing that both be public figures, that only the source be a public figure,
that only the target be a public figure, or even allowing republication
from any source about any target. The optimal solution, thus far unmen-
tioned in any case or article, is to allow neutral reportage whenever either
the source or the target is a public figure.
The main thrust of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 129 was to draw a
clear line between public and private figures, a division that has under-
girded all of defamation law since the case was decided in 1974. Simi-
128. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
129. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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larly, the main point of the rule proposed in this section is to distinguish
speech made by and about private figures from speech made by or about
public figures. The key in the preceding sentence is the placement of the
words "and" and "or." Under the proposed rule, three of four possibili-
ties would be protected: speech by public figures about public figures,
speech by public figures about private figures, and speech by private
figures about public figures. Speech by private figures about private
figures, may still give rise to liability. This rule remains faithful to Gertz
and defamation law in general by allowing less protection to public
figures. 1
30
There are four likely objections to this formula, and each will be
dealt with in turn. First, it may be asserted that republishing charges
made against a private figure target undercuts Gertz, which envisioned
only public figure plaintiffs. It is true that the proposed rule would pro-
tect the republication of defamatory speech about private individuals,
who have little access to the media to respond and who have not chosen
to shed some of their protection by seeking the limelight. However, this
can be countenanced because the public has a greater interest in knowing
what its public figures are saying than it does in protecting private figures
from accusations by public figures. Through an understanding of who is
130. By public figures, we should include Edwards' initial reference to organizations. For
instance, another newspaper or magazine, tabloids and gossip-mongering rags included, would
be a public figure in this analysis. Therefore, any paper could republish information printed in
another paper with attribution, because it would be quoting a public figure. Readers may
make their own judgments about reliability.
The running of syndicated columns should similarly be protected, as the unique case of
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967), realized long before neutral reportage was invented. There, Judge Skelly Wright re-
versed the district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment by the republisher of
syndicated columnist Drew Pearson's alleged defamation of a public figure plaintiff. Id. at 967.
The significant characteristic of this case was the court's willingness to allow the republication
of an item even though its reliability was in question. Using reasoning similar to that of the
Layne case, the court first explained that checking columns was a "time-consuming process, a
factor especially significant in the newspaper business where news quickly goes stale [and]
commentary rapidly becomes irrelevant." Id. at 972. Yet the opinion then noted that the very
unreliability of the columns made them important to protect:
We should be hesitant to impose responsibilities upon newspapers [that] can be met
only through costly procedures or through self-censorship designed to avoid the risks
of publishing controversial material. The costliness of this process would especially
deter less established publishers from taking chances and, since columns such as
Pearson's are highly popular attractions, competition with publishers who can afford
to verify or to litigate would become even more difficult. It is highly unlikely, more-
over, that the form of journalism engaged in by Pearson and other columnists could
survive in the face of a rule requiring verification to negate recklessness. Pearson and
his fellow columnists seek and often uncover the sensational, relying upon educated
instinct, wide knowledge[,] and confidential tips. Verification would be certain to dry
up much of the stream of information that finds its way into their hands.
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saying what, public figures may be analyzed more insightfully, their
statements reflecting as much about themselves as they do about the tar-
get. Inevitably, the conflicting interests are considered in a balancing
test. It is more important to refrain from chilling republication of speech
made by public figures, often the political speech at the core of the first
amendment, than to protect the reputations of private figure targets. It
should be noted that a private figure target is not without a remedy; the
target may still sue the public figure who made the original statements
under the Gertz standard of liability. Furthermore, if the charges were
damaging or serious enough, the media would in all likelihood be inter-
ested in the private figure's response, and thus would provide the private
figure access to the source.
A second potential objection to the proposed rule is that there is
simply no merit whatsoever in publishing knowingly false speech made
by private figure sources. This view correctly points out that the ration-
ale of learning about public figures through what they say is inapplicable
here. This is true, but by performing a second balancing test, it is evident
that the interest public figures have in their reputations is outweighed by
the public's need to know about charges made against public figures.
This situation is clearly covered by Gertz' rationale that public figure
targets require less protection because they have the ability to respond to
allegations in a public forum, and also because they must suffer some of
the slings and arrows that accompany entrance into the public arena.1 3 ,
131. An excellent example of neutral reportage at work with a private figure source and a
public figure target is the unfortunate case of Father Bruce Ritter, the former head of Cove-
nant House, a New York-based network of shelters for runaways. In December 1989, an
irresponsible, drug-abusing, runaway male prostitute, whose father had labeled him a chronic
liar, charged that Ritter had misused Covenant House funds and had offered him money in
exchange for sex. Here is a quintessentially unreliable source, who threatens with seemingly
outlandish charges the renowned head of one of New York's most esteemed charity programs.
The printing of these allegations, the New York Times knew, could well cripple a program
heavily dependent on private fundraising. On the other hand, the paper realized that if these
accusations were true, Ritter needed to be investigated before damaging Covenant House fur-
ther.
Instead of printing the allegations when they were made, the Times waited two days. On
December 14, it printed an article stating that the district attorney was investigating allega-
tions of financial improprieties concerning Father Ritter. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at B5,
col. 4. The paper mentioned that the New York Post had printed the allegations two days
earlier. The accuser was simply described as "a 20-year old man," and no references to sexual
activity were made. Id. The next day the Times offered the full story to its readers, but took
an interesting slant. Its lead was that Ritter denied allegations of financial misdoings and
sexual improprieties, not that someone had charged him with these activities. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 15, 1989, at B2, col. 4. Ritter was quoted as lamenting that "the greatest pain of all" was
the risk that public faith in him "had been shattered," which would have a devastating impact
on private donations. Id.
On February 6, 1990, the Ritter story finally made it out of the Metropolitan section and
onto the front page. The paper reported, "Church officials are investigating allegations by a
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The third possible protest against this proposal would come from
those who disfavor neutral reportage in any form. They would argue
that there is no merit whatsoever in knowingly republishing any false
speech. In weighing the harms and benefits of protecting false speech,
any harm at all to the target will always exceed the value of knowingly
false speech. Yet, as Diane Zimmerman has ably summarized, there are
a number of important reasons why knowingly false speech should be
protected. 132 First, to find objective truth is no easy matter. Therefore, it
is important to remain skeptical about judicially determined distinctions
between truth and falsehood.1 33 Second, many theorists argue that the
first amendment protects the search for truth; thus, false speech should
be protected because it can "spur the quest for truth... and sharpen our
understanding of the difference between truth and falsity." 134  Third,
other theorists maintain that the first amendment protects individual au-
tonomy, which includes a privilege to lie.13 Fourth, the government is
an "inherently undesirable" entity through which to mediate determina-
tions of truth and falsity. 136 The scales do not start balanced evenly be-
tween free speech and prohibiting false speech; instead, the first
amendment requires that there initially be placed a large weight on the
side of freedom of the press. Tilted in this manner, the scales are not
second man that, when he was in his mid-teens, he was drawn into a sexual relationship by
Father Ritter." N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1990, at Al, col. 1. In summarizing the events thus far,
the paper said, "What began late last year as a narrowly focused charge by [one individual] ...
has since broadened into a story of questionable expenditures, faked documents, and missing
records," not to mention sexual improprieties. Id. By the end of March, Ritter had taken a
leave of absence and then eventually quit Covenant House. After an investigation by the At-
torney General of New York and the IRS, numerous instances of financial and sexual miscon-
duct were revealed.
This case starkly illustrates both the risks and rewards of the neutral reportage doctrine.
A terrible source provides a big scoop containing devastating charges. If true, the public
should know and act upon the information; if false, the airing might erroneously cripple a
pillar of the community. The media can hope that if someone has a very favorable public
image, a mere allegation will usually not tarnish it. In the present case, it took substantiation
of the initial charge by other people and a government investigation before public opinion
began to swing against Ritter. On the other hand, in today's world of fickle public opinion,
even a trace of blood might summon the sharks. In assessing the Times' conduct, one would
imagine such initial restraint rarely occurs among competing dailies. By the same token, if all
papers waited for another source to take a chance and break the story, perhaps Ritter's activi-
ties would have remained veiled. Though no one can gainsay the dear price paid in reputation
for slanderous falsehoods, the Ritter case provides a paradigm of why speech and more speech
will ultimately lead to the truth.
132. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 364, 402-21 (1989).
133. Id. at 406.
134. Id. at 405.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 417.
1991]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
brought back to a state of balance by placing the harm of knowingly
publishing falsehoods on the other side.
The fourth possible objection to this proposal would come from
those who advocate freedom to republish anything, regardless of source,
or from those who would require that the matter be of public concern.1
37
As will be explained in the next section of this Article, public concern is
such a circular requirement that it truly is no limitation at all on the
republication of defamatory statements. By removing the ineffective con-
straint of public concern, we are left with the doctrine that any paper
may republish anything by anybody as long as it is accurately reported.
This clearly runs afoul of Gertz' repudiation of Rosenbloom, wherein the
Court refused to endorse a simple public concern standard."3 ' In addi-
tion, since so much of the edifice of defamation law was built upon the
distinction between public and private figures, it seems dubious to build a
law of neutral reportage without it.
H. Relevance to Controversy
The last potential requirement in constructing a new doctrine of
neutral reportage is that the defamatory statement must be made in the
course of a continuing public controversy. While Edwards required that
the republication be relevant to a controversy, 139 other opinions have ar-
gued that it should merely reflect a matter of public concern. 140 Contro-
versy, indeed, should be discarded as a standard, because it muddies the
waters with a concept that is absent elsewhere in defamation law, and
because it requires the press or the courts to arbitrate whether a given
event rises to the level of controversy.' 41 Public concern, too, is weak. A
public concern requirement is entirely circular, in that a newspaper, by
definition, publishes matters of public concern. It sells its stories to the
public and thus must print matters of public concern in order to run a
137. See, e.g., THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM, PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM
OF LIBEL LAW (1988), which proposes the barring of "any liability for merely reporting the
defamatory statements of others, when the statements involve issues of public interest or
concern."
138. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). However, were the courts to rein-
state Rosenbloom's public concern test, then there would not seem to be a great policy objec-
tion to allowing even this great a freedom. Of course, attribution would still have to be made
and the statement would have to be accurately reported, else the paper could use the neutral
reportage principle to shield itself from liability by simply pretending to quote a source when
making potentially defamatory statements.
139. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977); see also supra section II(A).
140. See section II(D) supra.
141. Gertz criticized Rosenbloom's public concern standard in part because it would occa-
sion federal judges "to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general
or public interest' and which do not." 418 U.S. at 346.
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business. If the paper did not feel that the public would be interested in a
story, it obviously would not run it. If the public is not concerned, it will
not buy the paper.
1 42
Therefore, there should be no requirement that a defamatory state-
ment be relevant either to a controversy or to a matter of public concern.
A paper should be able to republish anything as long as it adheres to the
other recommended guidelines. By removing public concern as a prereq-
uisite to the neutral reporting defense, we also avoid the argument that
Gertz specifically eliminated Rosenbloom's public concern test. Because
we are still requiring a public figure source or target, this approach does
not attempt to resuscitate Rosenbloom, but rather stays within the Gertz
guidelines.
I. Final Test
The prerequisites to the proposed doctrine of neutral reportage can
be summarized as follows:
1) The statements must be accurately reported;
2) no neutrality is required either in the sense of a disclaimer or
full presentation of both sides;
3) the statement must be attributed and the source identified;
4) the source need not be responsible;
5) the original statement may occur in public or private;
6 & 7) either the source or the target must be a public figure;
8) the rule covers any statement, regardless of whether it refers to a
controversy or not.
This list may be simplified as follows: The privilege of neutral reportage
will apply where a publisher accurately republishes any statement made by




The law of defamation has proven Gordian'43 in its complexity and
difficult to unravel. Perhaps Justice Black's Alexandrine solution of sim-
ply hacking through the knot and foregoing any censorship at all will
142. Since we are abandoning as futile any attempt to draw a line between everything news-
papers publish and those matters it publishes that are of public concern, we would do well to
repeat this in the law of privacy. There, "newsworthy" replaces "matters of public concern"
as the watchword, an even more risible standard. Clearly, a newspaper publishes news-that
is, items that are newsworthy. Privacy law should rid itself of this conundrum and accept that
what a newspaper publishes is newsworthy.
143. Gordius was a king of Phrygia. He tied the Gordian knot "that, according to proph-
ecy, was to be undone only by the person who was to rule Asia, and that was cut, rather than
untied, by Alexander the Great." THE RANDOM HoUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 610 (unabr. ed. 1971).
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eventually prove the wiser course than the present efforts to untie the
rope. This fearfulness of taking a wrong turn has caused the Supreme
Court to shy away from addressing the privilege of neutral reportage,
despite the conflicting history of this privilege in the various lower courts
and its importance to the media.
Perhaps Justice Blackmun's eagerness to get at the issue will pro-
voke the Court to take a look at the privilege in the near future. If the
occasion presents itself, the Court should recognize a constitutional privi-
lege of neutral reportage, explaining that it does not overlap with actual
malice. While the adoption of Edwards' standard would be preferable to
nothing, the Court should move beyond Edwards and permit the accu-
rate republication of any statement by or about a public figure as long as
attribution to and identification of the source are made. Only then would
the first amendment be most effectively served.
